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Abstract: 
 
Political-economic analyses of trade unions in post-industrial societies have shifted away from tradi-
tional class-analytic approaches to embrace insider/outsider and producer coalition arguments 
based on the assumption that unions hold on to the defence of their core constituencies in the face 
of labour market deregulation and dualisation. Challenging this conventional wisdom, we provide an 
analysis of union strategies in Italy and South Korea, two most-different union movements perceived 
as unlikely cases for the pursuit of broader social solidarity, and we argue that in both countries un-
ions have successively moved away from insider-focussed strategies. We show a movement towards 
“solidarity for all” in the industrial relations arena as well as in their social policy preferences. Fur-
thermore, unions also explored new avenues of political agency, often in alliance with civil society 
organisations. We ascribe this convergent trend towards a social model of unionism to a response of 
unions to a “double crisis”; that is a socio-economic crisis, which takes the form of a growing periph-
ery of the labour market associated with growing social exclusion, and a socio-political crisis, which 
takes the form of a increasing marginalisation of the unions from the political process pursued by 
right- and left-wing parties alike. 
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Social Solidarity for All? 
Trade Union Strategies, Labour Market Dualisation and the Welfare State in Italy and South Korea 
 
Labour markets across the OECD world have been under enormous pressure, and we observe rising 
social polarisation with the decline of stable, well-remunerated standard employment and the ex-
plosion of irregular and precarious jobs at the ever growing margins of labour markets. Globalisation 
and increasingly aggressive employer strategies have been identified as key drivers of labour market 
dualisation, but also governments’ labour market deregulation across the OECD (typically responding 
to business lobbying) allowed employers to change their employment practices.1 These develop-
ments pose fundamental challenges to trade unions, which have typically built their industrial and 
political strategies around the assumption of standard employment – not only as a social reality but 
also as a normative goal.  
 The new political-economic “mainstream” considers trade unions as being “complicit” in la-
bour market dualisation arguing that organised labour does not only prioritise insider interests at 
the expense of irregular workers, but also enters producer coalitions with employers to secure the 
privileged position of insiders, the core of their membership. In other words, insider/outsider and 
producer coalition theories assume that trade unions are ready to support the greater use of precar-
ious workers if this stabilises core workforces.2 This literature calls into question traditional political-
economic research that assumes organised labour as the genuine interest representation of the en-
tire working class.3 Although insider/outsider theory has rightly pointed out that it has become in-
creasingly difficult to assume one class interest with the successive differentiation of labour market 
positions, it merely perceives unions, based on rational choice assumptions, as an interest organisa-
tion of insiders, essentially reducing trade unions to business unionism. However, with reference to 
Hyman’s seminal work,4 recent contributions have highlighted cross-national diversity of trade un-
ions’ responses to labour market dualisation, underlining how unions’ historical identities and insti-
tutional structures shape organised labour’s strategies towards new challenges.5 
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 Whilst our analysis of the Italian and South Korean cases confirms the importance of union 
identity and structure, and thereby contributes to the emerging body of literature challenging insid-
er/outsider and producer coalition approaches, we also show how the perception of fundamental 
socio-economic and socio-political crises made organised labour call into question historically estab-
lished trade union identities and corresponding industrial relations and political strategies. Critically, 
we do not only observe changes in the industrial relations arena with unions displaying greater in-
clusiveness towards outsiders, but also a politicisation of union agency with organised labour more 
proactively engaging in social and labour market policy-making in order to protect both insiders and 
outsiders. Historically, Italian class unionism was preoccupied with the workplace and did not ascribe 
much importance to the universalisation of welfare, as wage increases and contributory social insur-
ance, of primary benefit to insiders (notably old-age pensions), were considered the main source for 
improving the living standards of the working class. In Korea, we also find union preoccupation with 
the workplace but rooted in business unionism, which considers unions a purely economic agency. 
However, in the face of dualisation and associated challenges to organised labour, in both Italy and 
Korea, we show trade unions’ deliberate strategies to open up their organisations to outsiders and 
to reinvent the movement by engaging and forming new coalitions with other civil society organisa-
tions for greater, universal public social welfare. In recognition of the limits of their historical organ-
ising models, labour movements in the two countries have, in other words, converged towards a 
new model of social unionism – understood as the development of solidaristic policies beyond their 
“traditional” constituencies (i.e. permanent workers) and domain of action (i.e. the workplace). 
Methodologically, these observations in Italy and Korea are particularly intriguing, as unions 
in both countries are commonly perceived as conservative forces that have been struggling with 
coming to terms with fast changing labour markets.6 Still, Italian unions are typically seen as being 
caught up in past class struggles,7 whereas Korean enterprise unions are commonly viewed as pursu-
ing some of the most particularistic strategies.8 However, contrary to the image of conservative 
forces, we show, with a most-different research design, unions’ capacity to “innovate” and develop 
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strategies that aim not only at confronting the secular process of dualisation but also at increasing 
inclusiveness towards labour market outsiders in two critical cases,9 where the historical predomi-
nance of workplace solidarity (based on strong class and business unionism, respectively) should be 
expected to present particularly high barriers towards greater inclusiveness and “solidarity for all” 
(especially if compared the inclusive social unionism of Scandinavian countries with Ghent systems, 
where trade unions run unemployment protection with the result of high union density including 
greater representation of outsiders). In our analysis, we distinguish between trade unions strategies 
in the workplace (that is, the industrial relations dimension) and their positions with regard to em-
ployment and social protection (especially, the inclusiveness with regard to labour market outsiders; 
that is, the public policy dimension). Empirically, in addition to trade union documents, the article 
rests upon 28 semi-structured interviews with labour activists and experts in the two countries. 
Trade unionists are drawn from different confederations and industrial unions to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the preferences and strategies across the labour movement in both countries.  
 
Trade Unions under Siege: Between “Old Battles” and Modernisation? 
Traditionally, the literature on the political economy of industrialised democracies, rooted in a class-
analytical understanding, perceived trade unions, together with social-democratic parties, as the 
natural interest representation of the entire working class – challenging the predominance of busi-
ness in capitalist societies. Empirically, this analysis largely builds on the Scandinavian experience, 
and on the Swedish case in particular. There, trade unions have historically enjoyed exceptionally 
high membership rates coupled with horizontal institutional structures that paved way to the pursuit 
of solidaristic and inclusive policies, as the entire working class was effectively represented by the 
labour movement.10 Yet, representing the entire working class has become an increasingly difficult 
task for unions with the intensification of distributional struggles since the 1970s. These are typically 
associated with globalisation and de-industrialisation – the former putting pressure on labour costs 
in increasingly price-sensitive global markets, and the latter transforming labour market structures, 
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especially through the rise of service sector employment and its association with fixed-term em-
ployment and shorter job tenure. The insider/outsider literature points out that the preferences for 
social and employment protection of someone in a traditional employment relation could be rather 
different to the interests of someone in irregular employment at the margins of the labour market. 
For insiders, it is argued that employment protection is an absolute priority, whereas unemployment 
protection is viewed critically because it tends to benefit labour market outsiders with their much 
greater exposure to the risk of unemployment.11  
Far-reaching dualisation in Continental and Southern Europe as well as East Asia, especially 
in the aftermath of labour market deregulation, can be thought as having intensified earlier distribu-
tional struggles, posing a fundamental challenge to organised labour that has built its industrial and 
political strategies around an assumption of standard (full) employment as both reality and norma-
tive goal. In this context, the literature increasingly questions the earlier class-analytical approach 
and rather depicts trade unions as “insider-focussed” organisations contributing to labour market 
dualisation. Empirically, the focus shifted from the Scandinavian experience to the dualising coun-
tries of Continental and Southern Europe. In the “Western” literature, a “new” political-economy 
consensus emerged suggesting that unions prioritise the interests of their core members in perma-
nent employment, but similar arguments can be observed in the East Asian political economy litera-
ture as well.12 Whilst insider-focused strategies might still involve considerable conflict between or-
ganised labour and employers with unions continuing to press for better wage and benefit packages 
for their members in collective bargaining, they also allow for the establishment of (cross-class) pro-
ducer coalitions between unions and employers. In exchange for their privileged position, insiders 
and their unions agree to the use of “cheaper” irregular workers in order to maintain their compa-
nies’ competitiveness. In this insider-oriented strategy at the explicit expense of outsiders, unions 
can indeed be considered “complicit” in dualisation and rising social inequality. Initially, this theori-
sation of unions’ preferences and agency was primarily inferred from the German experience, where 
scholars noted in particular a trend towards decentralisation of industrial relations that unions did 
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not significantly challenge and that led to labour pursuing increasingly particularistic interests in the 
workplace at the expense of broader social or class solidarity objectives.13 Unsurprisingly, labour 
market outsiders paid the price for particularistic union strategies, as they saw their position rapidly 
worsening in the realm of both the labour market (in the form of low-wage employment) and social 
protection. In a slight modification of the insider/outsider model, it is acknowledged that unions 
might not have a genuine preference for exposing outsiders to greater insecurity, but still they agree 
to labour market deregulation at the margins in order to maintain their position in labour market 
policy-making. Critically, whilst unions are here prepared to sacrifice outsiders, they are not assumed 
to give in on labour market protection for their core membership.14 Thus, effectively though reluc-
tantly, unions pursue insider/outsider strategies nonetheless. Models portraying unions as largely 
pursuing exclusive and particularistic strategies have gained much prominence in recent years and 
might be best described as the new political economy “mainstream”. Crucially, whilst most of this 
literature refers empirically to developments taking place in the 1990s and early 2000s, recent con-
tributions extended insider/outsider models and producer coalition arguments to the analysis of pol-
icy and institutional change during the recent financial and economic crisis.15 
Yet, the view of insider-focussed trade unions pursuing exclusive strategies is far from being 
unchallenged – on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The socio-economic transformations of 
globalisation and dualisation have hollowed out core workforces in manufacturing industries in par-
ticular, the traditional main pool for the recruitment of union members; and in the growing service 
sector we find labour struggling to mobilise new members (though with some notable exceptions, 
such as the Scandinavian countries). These transformations translated, across the OECD world, into a 
secular decline in trade union membership and provide the functional underpinnings for an alterna-
tive strategic orientation of trade unions, as the above described strategy of exclusivity cannot be 
expected to rejuvenate the movement. Rather, it might in fact undermine unions’ capacity to remain 
a meaningful social force. The crucial point to note here is that insider-focussed strategies might be 
feasible in a context of equilibrium between the “core and periphery”, where the former represents 
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a stable and extremely sizeable share of the labour market. However, we have seen a successive 
erosion of the core of the labour market and a related rise in social inequality,16 which can be 
thought as politically undermining the equilibrium that is commonly associated with dualisation.17 In 
other words, rather than considering dualisation a stable, self-reinforcing mechanism, it needs to be 
viewed as a potentially powerful mechanism altering the (perceived) benefits of institutional settings. 
This makes it theoretically plausible that unions, instead of prioritising insiders, pursue the opposite 
strategy, namely broadening their constituency and agency as a counter-movement to the secular 
trend of labour market liberalisation and segmentation of social protection occurring across ad-
vanced capitalist countries.18 In this context, increasing appeal to outsiders can be perceived as an 
alternative imperative, and the revitalisation literature suggests a strategy of greater inclusion that 
ascribes to unions “meaningful proactive choices beyond adaptation and subordination”.19 Critically, 
this literature refers to Hyman’s distinction between business, class and social unionism,20 and it ar-
gues that trade unions’ perception of what a problem is and corresponding responses are shaped by 
their historical identities and associated institutional structures.  
The importance of trade union identities and structures is empirically confirmed in recent 
work calling into question insider/outsider and producer coalition approaches.21 These contributions 
challenge the role of trade unions as drivers of dualisation and highlight cross-national variation in 
union responses to dualisation, teasing out the key role of unions’ historical identities and institu-
tional structures in explaining such variation. More specifically, recent accounts of union agency dis-
tinguish between business unionism leading, by and large, to insider-focussed particularistic strate-
gies, whereas class unionism and especially social unionism present greater openness towards rep-
resenting and bargaining on behalf of a broader constituency, including labour market outsiders. 
Again, the Scandinavian countries are prime examples of inclusive unionism, owing to their persis-
tently high membership rates, institutionalised involvement in the management of unemployment 
benefits through Ghent systems and an organisational structure that facilitates solidaristic linkages 
between segments of the workforce, which also extends to precarious workers and the unem-
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ployed.22 Notwithstanding profound structural transformations and associated socio-economic chal-
lenges, trade unions in these countries have found creative solutions to uphold highly solidaristic 
policies.23 Recent research has also found a “Southern European path” towards inclusive unionism, 
where strong class identity is identified as key factor behind unions’ choice to extend workplace sol-
idarity to labour market outsiders, while also highlighting, however, limited inclusion in the realm of 
social protection.24 In business unionism, limited outsider representation is possible only when the 
interests of insiders and outsiders overlap. Yet, recent research suggests a fairly exclusive stance of 
rather market-oriented unions, which are by and large to be found in Continental Europe and, in a 
much more pronounced fashion, in East Asia.25  
Despite providing important insights, these contributions, often based on the analysis of un-
ions at a single point in time, do not fully capture the transformation of trade union agency. Treating 
union identity as a “fixed” independent variable, the union-identity literature cannot account for the 
emergence of more inclusive social unionism in the two-most different cases considered here, 
namely Korean business unionism and Italian class unionism, both displaying significant barriers to 
the pursuit of broad solidaristic agendas. In particular, the Korean case challenges perceived wisdom, 
both in the mainstream literature and in more recent critical contributions; and it shows how, start-
ing from business unionism, unions can open up to a broader solidaristic orientation. The Italian case, 
on the other hand, shows that class-based unionism can pursue solidaristic strategies not only in the 
industrial relations arena but also in the realm of social protection. Thus, while union-identity ap-
proaches restrict their analysis to the industrial relations dimension, we broaden the empirical scope 
to the public and social policy preferences of trade unions, and we show how both Korean and Ital-
ian unions successfully moved from fully exclusive or partially inclusive strategies towards greater 
inclusiveness and solidarity in both the industrial relations and social protection domains. This raises 
the critical question of under what socio-economic and socio-political conditions should we expect 
unions’ identity to shift from an exclusive business model or a partially-inclusive class model towards 
a more widely inclusive model of “solidarity for all”. In the following, we first analyse how Italians 
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trade unions developed greater inclusiveness in the workplace and social protection, before turning 
to Korean organised labour.  
 
Italian Trade Union Strategies: From Workplace Solidarity to Social Solidarity 
The historical policy preferences of Italian unions along the industrial relations and public policy di-
mensions closely align with insider/outsider theory. Whilst, in principle, thriving for the representa-
tion of the working class in its entirety and opposing differential treatments between segments of 
the workforce, Italian unions strongly and exclusively focussed until the 1980s on defending their 
members’ interests by pushing for policies that would boost economic growth and permanent, well-
remunerated employment. To the extent that full employment was their prime interest, expanding 
social protection to the “unproductive” share of the population was actively opposed, denoting a 
strong workfarist orientation of union agency. This strategy achieved high levels of security for union 
members but scant social protection for those at the margins of the labour market (notably, the un-
employed and non-standard workers).26  
However, the 1990s brought about sharp changes. As economic and political pressures from 
globalisation and European integration grew stronger, successive (centre-left and centre-right) gov-
ernments implemented a series of reforms deregulating the labour market. In particular, despite 
unions’ scepticism towards supply-side reform of the labour market,27 the centre-left government 
passed a reform in 1997 that introduced a considerable degree of flexibility at the margins of the 
labour market (most notably, allowing temporary agency work, which was previously banned in Ita-
ly).28 As the 1997 reform has been considered as marking a departure from traditional labour market 
policy in Italy,29 examining union agency in the context of this reform is instructive to understand 
organised labour’s preferences and strategies in the face of labour market dualisation. Indeed, fol-
lowing the reform, non-standard work quickly ceased to be a residual phenomenon responding to 
specific needs (such as seasonal work) but rather became a defining feature of the labour market.30 
But where did unions stand in these processes? Instead of passively accepting labour market dualisa-
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tion, union strategy was characterised by efforts to contain labour market dualisation and collecti-
vise new social risks.31 Union documents from the mid-1990s show that the main challenge per-
ceived by unions was the sharply rising share of employment that no longer corresponded with the 
“traditional” workers that unions had been representing historically.32 Accordingly, it was identified 
as key responsibility of a confederal union “to recompose lacerations and juxtapositions among dif-
ferent subjects in the labour market and in the workplace”,33 with senior confederal leaders taking a 
particularly active role in setting an inclusive course as a response to labour market deregulation and 
the rise of workers in atypical forms of employment34. Indeed, the role of the confederations was 
highlighted by interviewees from across the union movement spectrum. A senior representative 
from the General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the traditionally left-leaning union, argued that: 
“We are a general confederation of labour, and we therefore think that labour as such must be rep-
resented, in its various forms, and that the interests of labour should always be unified and brought 
to unity.”35 The same reasoning was illustrated by a representative of the Italian Confederation of 
Workers’ Unions (CISL), the centrist-catholic confederation: “In our culture of representation […], the 
union should equally represent independent work, dependent work and […] atypical work, because 
it is part of our cultural approach which we have traditionally had.”36 Critically, this approach trav-
elled “down” from the confederations to industrial unions that also shared this view, as explained by 
a senior representative of the metal workers’ union: “The fact that the union is confederal favours 
the inclusion of all types of workers.”37 
In correspondence with the perceived challenge and responsibility, union agency took place 
at three different levels: (i) lobbying at the level of national policy-making;38 (ii) collective bargaining 
on behalf of non-standard workers; and (iii) setting up “bilateral funds” jointly managed with em-
ployers.39 Participation in national level policy-making took place in the macro-corporatist arena that 
characterised the Italian political economy in the 1990s.40 In this context, a collaborative relationship 
between the centre-left government and unions allowed them to exert significant influence on the 
outcome of the reform. Though unions could not prevent greater labour market flexibility, neither 
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could the government deregulate the labour market as much as it initially planned.41 Critically, in the 
1997 reform, unions were successful in achieving parity of salary between agency and permanent 
workers to disincentivise firms to replace regular workers with non-standard ones.42  
As far as collective bargaining is concerned, a landmark development was achieved in 1998 
when all the confederal unions set up organisations specifically to represent non-standard workers 
and to sign collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the association of temporary work agencies. 
The organisations representing non-standard workers operate in close cooperation with the indus-
try-level federations in a complementary relationship: the non-standard worker unions provide hori-
zontal representation focussing on issues that have to do with the nature of non-standard employ-
ment (for instance, setting ceilings on the use of non-standard contracts), while industry-level feder-
ations include non-standard workers to ensure that their needs are understood and catered for in 
the workplace.43 Motivated by a commitment towards workplace solidarity between non-standard 
and permanent workers, CBAs offered a set of policy solutions to meet the challenges that the un-
ions identified in an increasingly deregulated labour market: not only do CBAs reiterate parity of sal-
ary between agency workers and their colleagues on regular contracts, but also specify equality be-
tween regular and agency workers for a variety of non-wage issues and benefits, such as working 
hours, overtime/night-time work and annual leave.44 Furthermore, CBAs put a ceiling on the share of 
agency work that firms are allowed to employ as a proportion of the total workforce and an upper-
limit of 42 months to employment as agency worker before mandatory conversion into regular em-
ployment.45 Importantly, industry-level CBAs often go beyond CBAs for agency workers by making 
certain conditions more favourable, such as shorter timeframes for the conversion of agency work-
ers into regular employees,46 because, as explained by a CGIL official, “we keep thinking that atypical 
work cannot be seen as a stable condition for individuals, but it should rather be a temporary condi-
tion”.47 Thus, while the establishment of union organisations to represent non-standard workers 
might be interpreted as largely symbolic, the numerous CBAs that these organisations signed shortly 
11 
 
after their establishment provide significant evidence that rhetoric and action were strongly tied to-
gether.  
This development can be viewed as a path-dependent response stemming from the class 
orientation of Italian confederal unionism, which is characterised by the objective of representing all 
workers and bargaining on their behalf, regardless of their employment status.48 As further evidence 
of inclusive workplace strategies for all workers, it has been reported that not only atypical workers 
but also migrant workers in Italy enjoy highly inclusive strategies in the workplace, owing to unions’ 
historical class-oriented identity49. Yet, this line of reasoning could be challenged from an insid-
er/outsider perspective insofar as the provisions bargained through the collective agreements are of 
equal benefit to insiders by insulating them from competition from outsiders, and therefore could be 
regarded as part of an insider-focussed strategy. However, such an interpretation does not hold 
when we turn to the third strand of union agency, namely that of “bilateralism”. Through the estab-
lishment of a bilateral fund, jointly managed with employers and financed through mandatory con-
tributions by temporary work agencies, unions created a remarkable framework of training for agen-
cy workers, which had been identified in insider/outsider theory as a crucial demand of outsiders, 
yet one that unions are expected to oppose rather than to push for.50 Notably, despite Italy being a 
laggard by European standards in the provision of active labour market policy, Italian agency workers 
enjoy extensive access to training compared to their European counterparts, with over 35% of agen-
cy workers having received training in 2008 (of the countries for which comparative data is available, 
the Netherlands has the second highest share of coverage at 19%).51 This shows that the three con-
federal unions, through organisations specifically set-up to represent atypical workers, achieved re-
markable results in this policy area, and the framework of training for agency workers speaks strong-
ly in favour of an interpretation of union agency as one centred on the collectivisation of the risks 
stemming from labour market outsiderness rather than narrowly furthering insider interests. Indeed, 
extensive training opportunities for outsiders cannot be interpreted as (directly or indirectly) favour-
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ing insiders; rather, by improving outsiders’ employability they could be seen, if anything, as a threat 
to insiders.52  
The same strategic action described with respect to the introduction of temporary agency 
work in 1997 can also be found when a centre-right government passed a labour market reform in 
2003 that significantly expanded the types of non-standard work that employers could resort to 
(such as project-based work).53 In this context, unions still retained a role in the policy-making pro-
cess, albeit best characterised as conflictual rather than cooperative. Their ability to contain labour 
market dualisation was severely reduced, as the centre-right government did not show the same 
commitment to negotiating with unions displayed by the centre-left government,54 starting a pro-
cess of political marginalisation that would become even more pronounced in the following years. 
Yet, even in a colder political climate and in a context of proliferation of additional forms of irregular 
work, unions used collective bargaining at national, sectoral and firm level to represent non-
standard workers,55 displaying therefore a high degree of workplace solidarity.  
 Inclusive strategies along the industrial relations dimension in terms of both wage and non-
wage issues and in the domain of training, however, were not matched as far as social protection 
was concerned. Indeed, assessing the priorities of trade unions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it 
has been noted how unions, driven by the pursuit of workplace solidarity and full employment, have 
been reluctant to support non-contributory income protection, focussing instead their efforts on 
“(mostly  resistance  against)  pension reforms,  labour  market  competitiveness,  wage  negotiation  
and  insurance based  contributory unemployment compensation”.56 Paradigmatic in this respect 
was the establishment of a separate bilateral fund for the provision of income protection for agency 
workers that was characterised by strict adherence to social insurance principles and high contribu-
tory requirements. As such, the fund is effectively hardly accessible for agency workers, whose em-
ployment record is characterised by short and discontinuous social security contributions. In stark 
contrast with training opportunities, where Italian agency workers enjoyed a favourable outlook by 
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comparative standards, universal income protection that moved away from strict contributory prin-
ciples did not feature on unions’ agenda in the 1990s and the early 2000s.57  
This set of selectively inclusive preferences needs to be understood against the background 
of the time. Unions operated, politically, in a context in which they were (particularly in the 1990s) 
still a relevant player58 and, economically, in an expanding labour market.59 These two conditions 
were seen by unions as allowing them to include outsiders without deviating from their traditional 
agency rooted in class identity;60 and, accordingly, they devised a strategy that prioritised employ-
ment over social protection also for outsiders. In social concertation and collective bargaining, it be-
came a union priority, in the face of employers’ preference for an outright deregulation of tempo-
rary employment, to establish a framework facilitating the transition from non-standard work to 
permanent employment, which trade unions considered a feasible strategy in an expanding labour 
market.61   
Socio-economic and socio-political conditions, however, changed dramatically over the 
course of the following decade, and the viability of unions’ workfarist strategies was effectively un-
dermined by the 2007 global economic crisis and by unions’ increasing political marginalisation. In 
other words, the challenges that labour faced changed profoundly as the expansion of atypical em-
ployment became only one among several challenges that unions were faced with. In particular, ris-
ing poverty rates and social exclusion as a consequence of the economic crisis became a defining 
socio-economic feature, together with an increasingly hostile attitude of governments towards the 
unions. As a consequence of this “double crisis”, we find Italian unions moving towards social union-
ism, ascribing more importance than ever in the past to universal forms of social protection, and 
embracing a broader notion of social solidarity stretching beyond the industrial relations arena. The 
loss of one million jobs between 2008 and 201362 is a striking indicator of the changed socio-
economic context. In a shrinking labour market, an exclusive focus on fostering transitions from non-
standard to regular employment proved untenable, and the economic crisis provided the motiva-
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tions for a strategic re-orientation of union agency whereby the issue of income protection gained 
salience.  
This shift can be clearly detected through the changing policy position of the CGIL , which 
represents a critical case within the Italian labour movement, not only because it is the largest of the 
three confederal unions but also because it was most strongly oriented towards the workfarist ap-
proach in social policy. In 2010, the CGIL presented a two-pronged proposal for a more inclusive so-
cial protection system: firstly, contributory requirements should be lowered and made more homo-
geneous across sectors and firms; and secondly, a non-contributory element should be introduced to 
ensure coverage for those who cannot access the social insurance system. The proposal was moti-
vated precisely on the grounds of the changed material conditions. The document outlining the re-
form proposal begins by arguing that “the crisis […] has heightened the urgency and need to reform 
the social protection system”63 and that a reformed system should lead to “the inclusion through a 
public and universal system with no difference for workers based on economic sector, firm size, geo-
graphical location or type of employment”.64 The first part of the proposal was short-lived, as it was 
shelved by the technocratic government in office between 2011 and 2013 on the basis that it was 
fiscally too expensive.65 Nevertheless, several unions continued to campaign for more inclusive in-
come protection. An important agenda-setting role can be ascribed in particular to the CGIL affiliat-
ed union of workers in education and research, where staff is often employed on short-term con-
tracts (e.g. corresponding with the school year), which prevent them from making sufficient social 
security contributions to qualify for income support between contracts (e.g. during school closure in 
the summer holidays). The corresponding campaign, named “Employment is discontinuous, life 
isn’t”, has been launched in 2013 to keep the public spotlight on the issue of income protection for 
non-standard workers.66 Admittedly, active campaigning to universalise income protection was most 
prominent among those unions whose members are relatively more exposed to the risk of unem-
ployment.67 Conversely, such campaigns do not present a priority for unions representing workers in 
core industrial sectors, where discontinuous employment and corresponding gaps in income do not 
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pose a major threat to their members. However, it should be made explicit that lack of active en-
gagement did not translate into active opposition from these unions or parallel insider-oriented 
campaigns. Critically, the confederations – which are labour’s voice in public- and social-policy mak-
ing at the national level – developed their position in close correspondence with the preferences of 
the sectoral unions representing those workers highly exposed to discontinuous employment, con-
firming the commitment of confederal unions to represent all workers, including those in weaker 
segments of the labour market.68 Indeed, in the most recent reform of unemployment protection in 
2015, unions’ criticism was precisely directed at the lack of true universalism as the reform “failed to 
adequately cover quasi-subordinate [i.e. non-standard] workers and seasonal workers”.69  
The second strand of labour’s campaign for more inclusive social protection – namely the in-
troduction of a non-contributory element of income support – saw a more favourable political out-
come, as it developed through the “Alliance against Poverty” – a network of civil society organisa-
tions that the three confederal unions joined as founding partners. The Alliance against Poverty has 
been lobbying since 2013 for the introduction of a means-tested, non-contributory “Social Inclusion 
Income” in order to fill the considerable gaps in Italian social protection. Through the engagement 
with civil society organisations in the Alliance, the broader labour movement developed greater sen-
sitivity to the need to improve income protection for the rising number of individuals – both unem-
ployed and employed in low-wage jobs – facing the risk of poverty and social exclusion. In recent 
reforms, the role of the Alliance against Poverty has been significant. In particular, it has directly in-
spired a package of anti-poverty measures, featuring an inclusion income (detached from contribu-
tory requirements) as one of its central policies, which was approved by parliament in 2017.70 As 
such the proposal of the Alliance laid the grounds for the introduction of a national-level, non-
contributory income support scheme, which was never established before in Italy – the only Europe-
an country, together with Greece, where such instrument was not part of the social policy mix.71 The 
Minister of Labour and Welfare publicly acknowledged at the beginning of the legislative process the 
crucial role played by the Alliance in placing poverty and social exclusion at the centre of the political 
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debate and in defining the reform proposals that were being examined by the Parliament.72 Here, it 
is worth noting that organised labour, as the only actor within the Alliance with an established pro-
file and history of cooperation with policy-makers, played a critical role in making the Alliance’s pro-
posal gain political traction.73 As in the case of extending collective bargaining to outsiders, it was 
the confederal structure of the union that prompted participation of the confederations in this poli-
cy initiative, as explained by a senior CGIL official: “There has been the role of a group of senior un-
ionists that dealt with this issue [the Alliance and more broadly welfare universalization] at UIL, CISL 
an CGIL [the three confederal organisations]…and at one point…as the officials responsible for wel-
fare, we took the responsibility.”74 The three confederal unions, by joining the Alliance, embraced a 
notion of social solidarity including all non-standard workers as well as the unemployed, in disconti-
nuity with their strict workfarist tradition inherited from their class identity. The economic crisis cer-
tainly stands out as motivating factor for the evolution of unions’ preferences, with all three confed-
erations arguing that growing social exclusion after the crisis was a key challenge that they had to 
face and, therefore, was the key reason for joining the Alliance against Poverty,75 as articulated by a 
CGIL representative: “With the economic crisis, the phenomenon [of poverty] has increased and 
changed. Think for instance of families with young children, think for instance of working poverty. […] 
At that point, it has been a choice of the welfare department of the CGIL, as we realised two things: 
Firstly, that Italy did not have a system of guaranteed minimum income. […] Secondly, there were no 
specific policies against poverty other than very fragmented instruments that are nonetheless often 
referred to specific categories of workers. […] We were lacking an instrument and at that point and 
faced by those numbers [of growing poverty and social exclusion] we thought that an instrument 
was necessary.”76 Indeed, the crisis not only heightened the need to establish a universal instrument 
of income support, but also triggered a consensual approach across the three confederations allow-
ing them to overcome some disagreements, for instance on whom the main beneficiaries of the pol-
icy ought to be: “Between CGIL, CISL and UIL, there are differences. […] The fact that we stand to-
gether doesn’t mean we agree on everything. […] But I am happy with the work we’ve done within 
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the Alliance, exactly because we all shared an objective; and we all took a step back from our initial 
positions, because we found a way to work together. […] Yet, there were differences, and there still 
are.”77 
Yet, political considerations were also a crucial factor, as organised labour was challenged by 
increasing political marginalisation since the mid-2000s.78 As an example of the changed socio-
political context, Prime Minister Mario Monti (leading a technocratic government from 2011 to 2013) 
argued that the systematic involvement of social partners in policy-making has generated negative 
side-effects that future generations will have to pay for.79 Along the same lines, Prime Minister 
Matteo Renzi (leading a centre-left government from 2014 to 2016) argued rather outspokenly that 
“it is important […] to give a message that, if unions are against these proposals [of reform of the 
labour market], please let us continue and go ahead. We are not stopped by the fate of the unions. 
[…] I believe that people are on our side [i.e. the government], not on the side of the unions”.80 Im-
portantly, Prime Minister Renzi made these declarations at the peak of his political popularity, sig-
nalling the government‘s intention to pursue reforms without seeking union consent. Thus, the un-
ions not only saw their ability to influence policy-making significantly diminish, but they also faced 
the problem of their broader public recognition being actively undermined by governments of all 
stripes. Correspondingly, public opinion data show an increasing dissatisfaction of the general public 
with trade unions.81 In this respect, a policy document analysing the timing of the emergence of the 
Alliance against Poverty argues that unions’ unprecedented firm support for the universalisation of 
social protection should be partly ascribed to strategic political reasoning. In particular, promoting 
inclusive social policies allowed the unions to engage with parts of society that do not belong to 
their traditional constituencies, which can be seen as an attempt to reverse the trend of decreasing 
popularity with the public.82 Consistent with this assessment, a representative of one of the confed-
eral unions, CISL, explicitly linked joining the Alliance to an effort of unions to “gain new social legit-
imisation” in recognition that unions “cannot limit themselves to the protection and promotion of 
permanent workers and pensioners”,83 denoting how the different socio-political context provided 
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an incentive structure for unions’ to devise strategies beyond their traditional constituencies and 
their traditional domain of the workplace. A similar strategic reasoning was developed by a senior 
CGIL official responsible for social policies: “On the terrain of universalism and welfare, the tradi-
tional union battle is not enough, because if you take the traditional union stance not only you will 
lean more towards the protection of dependent work but also because you would often end up with 
insurance-based solutions. […] On universalism, I believe there should be different proposals next to 
a different thinking.”84 
To conclude, as governments first deregulated the labour market in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, workplace solidarity was quickly extended to non-standard workers but the universalisation 
of income protection was not being pursued as convincingly. Unions, in other words, tried to include 
a new segment of the workforce by making use of, by and large, their traditional strategies (that is 
prioritising employment conditions over welfare also for non-standard workers). Yet, their strict ad-
herence to a workfarist class identity was challenged by the economic crisis and by their increasing 
political marginalisation. The shrinking of the core workforce coupled with rising social exclusion 
challenged the effectiveness of strategies based primarily on workplace solidarity. In this context, 
extending the coverage of income protection became an important element of unions’ strategy, 
which led them not only to respond to profound socio-economic transformations but also to engage 
in new forms of socio-political agency. The more comprehensive solidaristic re-orientation of union 
agency signals an increasing concern towards the unemployed and an increasing openness towards 
non-contributory forms of income support, which is not replacing the traditional focus on workplace 
solidarity but it rather presents an extension of union agency to relatively new (social and public) 
policy domains. 
 
Korean Trade Unions Strategies: From Business Unionism to Social Solidarity 
Prior to Korea’ democratisation in 1987, the country’s social policies can be described as being most 
modest with only small parts of the population receiving minimal social protection (e.g. civil servants 
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and core industrial workers). Instead of providing social welfare, the authoritarian state “protected” 
jobs with strict employment regulations and in particular with enforcing a no-lay-off policy in large 
workplaces. Also, rapid industrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s created plenty of job opportunities 
and allowed for relatively little social inequality despite residual social protection. Here, the govern-
ment’s wage guidelines were critical, as they prevented any significant wage differences between 
large companies and SMEs.85 Whilst acknowledging the interests of workers, the authoritarian state 
did not allow any meaningful interest representation, as this was feared to facilitate progressive ide-
ology and class identity that could have destabilised the undemocratic regime. Yet, some limited 
workers’ organisation in the workplace was permitted to keep the labour movement fragmented by 
promoting business unionism and forcing unions to be affiliated with the government-sanctioned 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU).86 
 Democratisation in the late 1980s, however, provided organised labour with unprecedented 
power resources – and, with great militancy, unions (in large workplaces in particular) used their 
new strength to achieve considerable improvements in wages and enterprise welfare, opening up an 
increasing gap between large companies and SMEs. At the same time, employers, confronted with 
considerable increases in labour costs which put mounting pressure on the price competitiveness of 
export-oriented industries, started pressing for labour market deregulation, and a right-wing gov-
ernment (1993-98) responded to calls for neo-liberal reform. In awareness of the strength and mili-
tancy of organised labour, though, the government proposed the introduction of unemployment 
protection (albeit modest and restricted to labour market insiders) in order to achieve consensual 
labour market reform. But unions did not show any interest in unemployment protection. Not only 
was employment protection considered an absolute priority by unions, but also it was believed that 
action in the industrial arena (namely, achieving better wages and enterprise welfare) was the best 
strategy for improving the material conditions of workers, effectively making public social protection 
an afterthought at best. After failed negotiations, the government enacted labour market deregula-
tion unilaterally, but a general strike that brought the country to a stand-still for one month pre-
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vented the implementation of labour market reform.87 Apparently, corresponding with insid-
er/outsider theory, organised labour after democratisation continued to be preoccupied with partic-
ularistic interests in the workplace (especially, large ones), whilst showing little, if not no concerns 
for those at the margins of the labour market and especially the unemployed. The weakest groups in 
society, who would have benefited immensely from greater public welfare and particularly unem-
ployment protection, because of their weak labour market position, were not represented by organ-
ised labour. In Korean business unionism, solidarity remained restricted to fellow union members in 
their workplace. 
 The scene changed dramatically with the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. Unemployment 
rose from 2 to 8.5 percent; and the country saw major bankruptcies across the economy, including 
chaebols (family-controlled business conglomerates), which were previously considered to be “safe 
havens” for employment. In this severe economic crisis and faced with large-scale foreign capital 
flight, the newly-elected centre-left government (1998-2003), despite previously rejecting deregula-
tion, saw no alternative to greater labour market flexibility for both insiders and outsiders in order to 
facilitate the restructuring of failing companies. Having learnt the lesson from its predecessor, the 
new administration proactively sought consensual labour market reform, and it put much emphasis 
on negotiations in the Tripartite Commission, through which both organised business and labour 
were formally involved in labour market policy-making.88 Importantly, besides FKTU, a formerly out-
lawed and competing trade union confederation with strong links to the democratisation movement 
was invited as well. Rejecting FKTU’s business unionisms, the leaders of the Korean Confederation of 
Trade Unions (KCTU) strived for broader economic and social reform, and we thus find KCTU as a 
peak organisation best characterised as social (movement) unionism – and this social unionism iden-
tity drove its fundamental motivation to embrace labour market outsiders. Having said this, at the 
workplace level, KCTU member unions (particularly chaebol enterprise unions, which enjoyed great 
autonomy) pursued, with great militancy, insider interests for their constituencies.89 
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 In the Tripartite Commission, both labour confederations pursued a radical policy U-turn by 
accepting labour market deregulation of both regular and irregular employment, in exchange of im-
proved unemployment protection (especially, for outsiders) and improved labour rights (for instance, 
the recognition of teachers’ unions). Here, it is important to underline that organised labour priori-
tised improving unemployment protection for outsiders, when other insider-focussed policies (such 
as improving Bismarckian old-age security) could have been demanded – indicating unions’ genuine 
commitment to improving the conditions for irregular workers. For consenting to deregulation, the 
experience of large-scale bankruptcies was critical, as union leaders acknowledged the “new reality” 
of limits to the established practice of life-time employment, and more generally they arrived at the 
conclusion that the traditional welfare-through-work model had become ever less feasible consider-
ing Korea’s extremely export-oriented growth model in evermore competitive global markets (that is, 
the recognition of severe limits to future wage increases and enterprise welfare). With (militant) in-
dustrial action increasingly struggling to achieve better living conditions for workers, “in the wake of 
the crisis, KCTU tried to shift their emphasis from wage increases at firm level to public welfare poli-
cies”90, as explained by a senior policy officer at FKTU; and we observe both KCTU and FKTU pushing 
for these policies beyond the readiness of the new centre-left government.91 In addition to this 
change in the material conditions, Korean unions also faced mounting criticism in the public that 
they were largely self-serving, prioritising insider interests and effectively ignoring those at the mar-
gins of the labour market. Although the public showed a great support to the labour movement dur-
ing the period immediately after the democratic transition, due to unions’ active involvement in the 
democratic struggle, the immense public criticism and pressure to overcome the narrow interest 
representation was perceived as a potentially existential crisis of the Korean labour movement, 
which also experienced a significant drop in membership. In this context, union leaders, especially 
those of labour federations, effectively fearing de-legitimisation in society, felt the imperative to “re-
invent” and “revitalise” the movement in order to re-main a meaningful social force – “to address 
the public criticism of self-serving behaviour, the representation of labour market outsiders was con-
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sidered critical”92, a senior policy officer with KCTU underlines. In other words, they considered rein-
venting the labour movement as an inclusive one, by championing the right of labour market outsid-
ers, key to the re-legitimisation and revitalisation of the movement.93  
Thus, the East Asian crisis fundamentally changed the socio-economic and socio-political un-
derpinnings for unions, challenging established behaviours and strategies, and the Tripartite Com-
mission provided labour confederations a new forum for exercising influence in social policy-making. 
The KCTU leadership in particular, corresponding with its social movement identity and its ideologi-
cal desire for broader economic and social reform, seized this opportunity by promoting broader 
social solidarity in the form of better social protection for those at the periphery of the labour mar-
ket. FKTU, though in the past explicitly rejecting the inclusion of outsiders in social insurances,94 
adopted in principle the same positions despite the lack of any social movement legacy. “Increased 
competition [for members] between the two confederations”95, as highlighted by a senior policy of-
ficer at FKTU, and a political climate in which the conditions of irregular workers became a major 
political issue that could not be ignored pushed FKTU towards the left, whilst in practice still main-
taining a more conciliatory approach and greater readiness to compromise in correspondence with 
the union’s legacy of pragmatic business unionism.96 
 The policy U-turn of union confederations, however, created a serious cleavage between the 
centre and enterprise unions (especially, chaebol unions), which continued to prioritise insider inter-
ests and fiercely opposed the deregulation of regular employment. The KCTU leadership was particu-
larly challenged and eventually replaced, although the change in leadership had no direct policy im-
plications. Nonetheless, it revealed deep divisions that existed within labour. Many enterprise un-
ions, lacking a sense of solidarity beyond their narrow membership, not only prevented irregular 
workers from joining them, but insiders actually looked quite favourably at the use of non-standard 
workers, as these were seen, acknowledged by representatives from both KCTU and FKTU, as “buff-
ers”97 that contributed to their employment security in economic crisis.98 In other words, progressive 
union leaders, recognising the risks and dangers of irregular employment, faced enterprise unions 
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that were prepared to enter producer coalition with employers in order to secure their employment 
at the expense of outsiders.  
However, the massive increase in irregular employment in the aftermath of the East Asian 
financial crisis and labour market deregulation made many enterprise unions more receptive to-
wards the concerns of non-standard workers. Across different parts of the union movement, labour 
market dualisation was increasingly seen as raising “the question of organisational strength and sur-
vival of unions as a meaningful social force”99, as put by a KCTU senior policy officer – with dualisa-
tion eroding internal labour markets from which the great majority of members were recruited. In 
other words, irregular employment was not only considered a social problem but also as a “serious 
crisis for the labour movement” 100, as argued by a representative of the KCTU affiliated Seoul Gen-
eral Union. Unsurprisingly, industries that were particularly hit by economic crisis (for instance, the 
finance sector) opened up to irregular workers more quickly, whereas the metalworking industry, for 
example, was somewhat slow to change. In fact, Hyundai Heavy Industry company union was ex-
pelled from the Korean Metal Workers’ Union (a KCTU member union) for their discriminatory 
stance towards non-standard workers. However, when the shipbuilding industry faced severe corpo-
rate restructuring in the face of increasing competition from China, enterprise unions in shipbuilding 
and other metal-working industries started to represent the interests of outsiders as well (for in-
stance, negotiating wages on their behalf for greater workplace solidarity), in recognition that 
“cheap” irregular employment and the widening gap between insiders and outsiders ultimately pre-
sents “a barrier to achieving standard workers’ demands for better wages and working conditions”, 
as summarised by a representative from the KCTU affiliated metal workers’ union.101 Having said this, 
despite greater inclusiveness, enterprise unions did not give up their prioritisation of insiders, but 
they started to perceive an overlap of insider and outsider interests.102  
In addition to the observed change in the material conditions, it is important to highlight 
that pressure from labour confederations on company unions to become more inclusive “has started 
to make a difference”.103 The genuine commitment of peak organisations to greater inclusiveness 
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towards labour market outsiders was translated into important action – including the above men-
tioned expulsion of Hyundai Heavy Industry company union, but also KCTU’s “solidarity wage” initia-
tive, which a union officer explicitly described as a strategy “to close the wage gap between standard 
and non-standard workers”104 by promoting lump-sum pay increases rather than percentage point 
increases to the benefit of better remunerated regular workers.105 Furthermore, recognising the in-
stitutional deficiencies of Korea’s fragmented industrial relations system, the union leadership inten-
sified the reorganisation along industrial union structures, with support from many enterprise un-
ions acknowledging that one, in the words of a policy officer of the FKTU affiliated financial industry 
union, “cannot fight capital as company unions”.106 Although these initiatives might have been of 
limited success because of great hostility from business (and in fact some powerful chaebol un-
ions),107 these observations question the assumption of exclusive unions in insider/outsider and pro-
ducer coalition theories. 
In the domain of public policy, we also find unions, in close cooperation with civil society or-
ganisations, pushing for legislation on irregular employment starting in 2000. The massive increase 
in non-standard employment and the growing gap between insiders and outsiders made dualisation 
and associated social inequality and exclusion important political issues that could not be ignored by 
any progressive force.108 Joining forces in the “Alliance for Non-Standard Workers” for greater politi-
cal impact, trade unions and civil society organisations set the agenda for limiting irregular employ-
ment and stipulating the principle of non-discrimination, whereas the second centre-left but busi-
ness-friendly government (2003-2008) was only prepared to commit to much laxer regulation (for 
instance, the proposal of a three-year limit and allowing reasonable discrimination of irregular work-
ers). However, pressure from unions in the Tripartite Commission, especially from KCTU, was critical 
for making the government compromise to limiting fixed-term employment to two years and out-
lawing discrimination based on employment status, though the legislation did not materialise before 
2008.109  
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The innovations of the legislation on irregular employment were followed by two conserva-
tive governments (until 2017) with a comprehensive deregulation agenda, including the deregulation 
of atypical employment (e.g. allowing four years of fixed-term employment). This met fierce opposi-
tion from unions and civil society groups, which were able to block attempts by these governments 
to deregulate the labour market, especially through unions’ involvement in the Tripartite Commis-
sion where the government sought to achieve consensual labour market reforms. At the same time, 
however, unions and civil society (in a rather hostile political environment) were obviously not in a 
position to achieve any better protection of irregular workers with the conservative governments 
taking extremely business-friendly positions.110 Despite no social progress, this episode (that is, the 
prevention of further deregulation) suggests that organised labour has developed into a de-facto 
veto player in labour market reform, even during the rule of the political right with little meaningful 
access to political decision-makers.111 
In May 2017, following the impeachment of the conservative President, the centre-left took 
control of government, with an agenda of social modernisation; and tackling social inequality associ-
ated with the rise in irregular employment was identified as a political priority.112 Whilst out of pow-
er, the centre-left party endeavoured to build stronger links with organised labour to consolidate its 
support base; and unions also sought to firm up ties with the centre-left, as exemplified by a high-
profile event in 2012 when around a thousand trade union members (including a former president 
of KCTU and other prominent leaders) joined the party.113 Labour activists were heavily involved in 
the centre-left President’s election campaign, with former senior union leaders from KCTU and FKTU 
filling important positions in the candidate’s labour policy committee and the President’s transition 
team after the election. Not only have unions shaped the President’s labour market policy agenda, 
but we also find labour activists in key government positions, most notably the minister of labour 
and the president of the Tripartite Commission (a minister-level appointment).114 After the election, 
the new President presented a five-year plan of government priorities; including further limiting ir-
regular employment, introducing stricter non-discrimination measures, reducing irregular employ-
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ment by creating decent jobs, and converting irregular workers in the public sector into standard 
workers.115 Whilst the previous, right-wing governments took great advantage of the deregulated 
labour market, not only is the new government set to present a best-practice example as an em-
ployer, it also puts increasing pressure on private employers to convert irregular to regular jobs. The 
conservative governments’ weak enforcement of labour laws has already been reversed with the 
ministry of labour pursuing prosecution and heavy fines of non-compliant businesses.116 In light of 
these recent developments, it is not surprising that the new government is widely considered “pro-
labour” reflecting trade unions’ growing influence on public policy, whereas business expresses 
strong discontent, claiming “government only listens to unions”.117  
Obviously, union action does not fit the producer coalition argument, although some union 
behaviour might still be read as not challenging the insider/outsider model. Yet, when contextualis-
ing union behaviour, we find strong support for genuine concerns for irregular workers, and the 
emergence of the Alliance for Non-Standard Workers, combing union and civil society forces, pro-
vides strong support for the argument of social (movement) unionism transforming Korean organ-
ised labour and pushing back long-established business unionism. The identity of KCTU’s leadership 
as a social movement (that is, striving for social justice and social progress for all) was critical for 
overcoming narrow insider interest representation, and the progressive leadership used the “win-
dow of opportunity” for innovation and revitalisation that the East Asian financial crisis and the sub-
sequent social crisis of dualisation provided. In the new socio-economic environment, the limits of 
old union strategies became increasingly obvious, in addition to the crises putting unions under 
enormous public pressure to display greater responsiveness to dualisation and the poor conditions 
of irregular workers. We thus find proactive trade unions that display capacity to innovate with a 
view on current and future strategic capacity challenging the depiction of unions that cannot over-
come narrow insider interests. The sequencing in the Korean case (that is, the initial prioritisation of 
social protection in union modernisation) can be interpreted in terms of institutional capacity. The 
historical dominance of enterprise unions in Korean industrial relations and the weakness of labour 
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federations did, at first, not allow union modernisation at the workplace level. However, social con-
certation to cope with the East Asian financial crisis gave union federations a strong voice in labour 
market and social policy-making, which union leadership used for social policy modernisation. After 
labour market deregulation, irregular employment increased massively with a huge impact in Korean 
workplaces. Slowly, enterprise unions started to “wake up” to the far-reaching changes in the Kore-
an labour market, translating into changing union behaviour in many workplaces. In other words, we 
have started to observe modernisation in the industrial relations dimension as well; and more re-
cently with the election of a centre-left government, unions have gained possibly unprecedented 
influence in public policy that could be interpreted as a result of organised labour’s strategic re-
orientation.   
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Conclusions 
There is no doubt that labour market dualisation put organised labour under pressure. But far from 
simply turning inwards, trade unions in Italy and Korea displayed the capacity to overcome their 
strong insider orientation, and opened up their organisations to labour market outsiders, despite 
coming from very different historical models of unionism, each presenting rather high barriers to the 
pursuit of “social solidarity for all”. In both the industrial relations and public policy domains, unions 
developed greater inclusiveness overcoming their narrow conceptions of solidarity restricted to the 
workplace. Labour market dualisation made historically established organising models and industrial 
strategies ever less feasible with the decline of standard employment. In Italy, unions with class 
identity and a moral claim to represent the entire working class could no longer ignore labour mar-
ket outsiders, who saw massive increases after labour market deregulation. In correspondence with 
Italian class unionism, greater inclusiveness focussed, at first, on the workplace; and unions effec-
tively extended their established industrial strategies towards outsiders. But as the economic crisis 
contributed to an ever-growing periphery of the labour market, unions acknowledged the limits of 
an inclusive strategy focussed on the industrial relations dimension; and they started ascribing 
greater prominence to universalistic social protection policies. Here, it is also important to note the 
increasing political marginalisation of unions actively pursued by successive governments, including 
– critically – the centre-left. The turning towards civil society with the Alliance against Poverty might 
thus be considered a sensible response towards the increasingly “cold climate” between the political 
left and organised labour. Whilst our observation of greater inclusiveness challenges the new politi-
cal economy mainstream, the increasing distance between political left and labour also presents a 
problem for traditional political economy research rooted in the power resources model, assuming a 
“natural” alliance between social democracy and trade unions.  
 Developments in Korea, despite much higher barriers towards change, display great similari-
ty, but we observe inverse sequencing that is associated with differences in industrial relations re-
gime, highlighting the importance of institutional structures shaping behavioural changes and strat-
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egies. The predominance of “exclusive” business unionism did, at first, not allow for innovations in 
the workplace, even though progressive union leaders had long acknowledged problems with Kore-
an enterprise unionism. But the KCTU leadership was able to use the East Asian financial crisis inno-
vatively to champion the social rights of outsiders (most notably, improved unemployment protec-
tion), and public pressure made the more conservative FKTU follow the lead of their left competitors. 
Also, a massive drop in union membership since early democratisation (exceeding the long-term 
secular decline in Italy) added to a sense of an existential crisis. In this context, the attempt of corpo-
ratist concertation to cope with the East Asian financial crisis provided union leaders with a window 
of opportunity to “reinvent” the movement – though this triggered massive discontent with enter-
prise unions. The scene changed in the aftermath of labour market deregulation. On the one hand, 
the massive growth in irregular workers gradually undermined the conditions of insiders, and for this 
reason company unions, which had previously looked somewhat favourably at “cheap” outsiders in 
correspondence with the producer coalition approach, became increasingly engaged in negotiating 
on behalf of irregular workers in order to prevent further growth in the gap between insiders and 
outsiders.  Thus, to some extent, the interest of outsiders and insider started overlapping, which al-
lowed greater inclusiveness at the workplace level – though with limits. This is recognised by union 
leaders, which have started to push for industrial union in order to overcome the inherit faults of 
Korean enterprise unionism. On the other hand, as in the Italian case, Korean unions faced increas-
ing political marginalisation with rather business-friendly governments, including the second centre-
left government as far as labour market policy was concerned. In this context, unions joined forces 
with civil society organisations to promote the labour and social rights of irregular workers. Thus, as 
in Italy, Korean unions started to embrace more inclusive social unionism including deeper coopera-
tion with civil society, and this allowed for weakening though admittedly not abandoning business 
unionism and associated insider orientation in parts of the union movement, especially in some 
powerful chaebol unions.  
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 However, regardless of some “legacy effects”, it is remarkable, especially if considering the 
“mainstream” of insider/outsider and producer coalition theories, how unions in two most-different 
industrial relations systems reflected upon institutional weaknesses and the political context, and 
then made deliberate efforts to increase the inclusiveness of organised labour and turned towards 
civil society in order to regain social force and legitimisation. This shows that dualisation is not a sta-
ble equilibrium, but it needs to be considered a powerful mechanism that has the capacity to alter 
the preferences and strategies of key political and economic agency.118 In Italy and Korea, the rise of 
social unionism and the associated politicisation of unions that in the past focussed on the work-
place was critical for overcoming narrow industrial strategies and making better social policy a trade 
union priority – that is moving from workplace solidarity towards social solidarity. Intriguingly, with 
some significant “delay” though, we appear to observe similar developments in Germany, where 
unions (also facing a hollowing-out of the core, fierce low-wage competition and a public that views 
dualisation and inequality rather critically) have turned towards greater outsider inclusiveness with 
the recent introduction of a minimum wage and an increasingly critical stance towards temporary 
agency work.119 Despite greater social solidarity, this is not to argue that problems do not persist. On 
the contrary, dualisation and social inequality are still massive social problems in Italy and Korea, as 
elsewhere; and unions are still in the process of consolidating their new industrial and political strat-
egies. But this should not deflect from organised labour’s capacity to innovate and respond strategi-
cally to socio-economic and socio-political challenges; and, in Korea, with the recent election of a 
progressive centre-left government that was greatly shaped by unions’ and civil society’s agenda-
setting, a window of opportunity might have opened for substantial social reform.   
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